ABSTRACT We seek to explain the desire for community return by displaced persons in Bosnia. We find a key difference between the minorities displaced from the urban and rural parts of Bosnia. While the rural displaced tend to value community returns, the urban displaced are unlikely to do so; hence the generally low success rate of urban returns in post-war Bosnia. Family dynamics seems to influence community returns, as the decision to return often seems to be made by families, not isolated individuals.
Introduction
The Bosnian civil war of the early to mid 1990s left a great number of individuals and families displaced either as refugees in third countries or internally displaced within their own country. In this article we seek to understand the desire for a community return process that brings displaced persons back to their original homes alongside former neighbours, using Bosnia as a case study. The analysis is broken into six sections. We start with a detailed overview of the political context of the return process in post-war Bosnia. We then lay out our five major hypotheses and suggest their possible impact on the desire for a communal return; the home hypothesis, the security hypothesis, the nationalism hypothesis, the social capital hypothesis and the socio-economic hypothesis.
Next, we describe the data and methods, specifically our use of a survey conducted in In our findings section we breakdown the characteristics of returnees by period of return and create regression models for both returnees and those who are still displaced to predict what factors would lead someone to desire community return. We test each of the hypotheses in turn. In our discussion section we examine the results more thoroughly and point to common threads of higher preference for community return in rural areas and among the less nationalistic as well as the significance of family dynamics in the return process. We conclude with a brief discussion of the significance and limitations of our findings and their implications going forward for Bosnia-Herzegovina and other areas experiencing large scale displacement.
The Context of Bosnian Returns
Bosnia is a critical case study for refugee and forced migration studies, not only for the intensity and variation in conflict experience among displaced persons, but also for the policies employed following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord to facilitate peaceful voluntary return. The civil war of 1993-1995 left about 2.2 million displaced out of the pre-war population of 4.37 in a war equated in the international media with ethnic cleansing.
1 Even though the Dayton Peace Accord stipulated the federalization of Bosnia across ethnic lines, it also protected the right of return for displaced persons and assigned its implementation to international agencies, hoping to enable minorities to return to their former homes (Black 2001; Bieber 2006) . The implementation of the Accord was not straightforward, however. It was slowly applied through a process of trial and error, and early attempts to ensure the safety of minority returnees and the return of their property met with strong resistance from nationalist political authorities and extremist groups (Sert 2008, p. 106) . Even so, by
March 2005, 92% of the property restitution claims were resolved (Sert 2008, p. 97) 5 allowing the restoration of some pre-war communities through organized community return, with only few individual returns in others. As demonstrated elsewhere in the literature on return, Bosnia has been a partial success story: some areas have had experienced few 'individual returns,' i.e. handful of individuals returning and unable to re-establish their pre-war communities and institutions. Other areas experienced 'group return,' with large groups of organized returnees able to recreate their major educational, political and social institutions (Black 2001; Bieber 2006; Belloni 2011) .
In this article, we go a step further. We take a closer look at the key features of the Bosnian return experience, focusing on the differences between the minorities displaced from the urban and rural parts of the country, the significance of family dynamics for successful community returns, and the role of nationalist ideology in preventing displaced persons from returning as minority returnees. We find that the Bosnian return process, despite its partial successes and limitations, is one of the first relatively successful attempts to reverse ethnic cleansing in the contemporary history of the Balkans and the Middle East.
Clearly, the Bosnian return experience has had some major difficulties. In the early years, the international community's efforts were scattered and sometimes conflictual (Toal and Dahlman 2011, p. 146) . In this period, majority returns were possible but minority returns were rare and often dangerous. But with a change in the control of returns to a centralized international force, the security and legal situation of minority returnees improved, numbers increased, and returns peaked in 2000 -2003 (Bieber 2006 , with 306,485 of the total 434,206 minority returnees arriving home (Toal and Dahlman 2011, p. 262) . After the peak years, minority returns again slowed, possibly due to Bosnia's weak economy and/or ethnic discrimination in the job market.
In terms of ethnic differences in returns, Bosniac internally displaced persons
[IDPs] were more likely to return than their Serb or Croat counterparts. The ethnic differences in the return rates are usually understood as a reflection of the post-war politics in the three Bosnian constitutive nations. On the one hand, Serb and Croat nationalists had generally focused on 'right-peopling' their ethno-territorial regions, that is, on replacing the ethnically cleansed Others with IDPs from their respective ethnic groups. Accordingly, Serb and Croat IDPs were pressured by 'their' nationalists to stay on 'their' territories, with return represented as 'unpatriotic' and strongly discouraged (Toal and Dahlman 2011, p. 169, 185) . On the other hand, Bosniac nationalists used return to re-capture territories lost during the war (Toal and Dahlman 2011, p. 167-176) .
One Bosniac mayor explained a successful case of mass Bosniac return as 'we have retaken that territory with our people' (Toal and Dahlman 2011, p. 176) . Physical returns (as opposed to just property return or exchange) had an impact on votes for the local nationalist parties, making them a threat or boon to local political control (Sert 2011, p. 222) . For nationalists on all sides, the freedom of IDPs to decide for themselves where they wanted to live was less important than victories in local elections and control over territory.
While the property restitution policy in Bosnia was a major success, the return of property generally did not lead to the return of people, as many forced migrants exchanged or sold their property. Sert (2011, p. 223) (UARDPRB 2010, p. 16) . Even in the townships where community effort led to successful mass return, the return was often not followed by well-designed and funded local economic development programs. While many Bosnians suffered from very high unemployment -around 40% in the early 2000s --the minority returnees also faced ethnic discrimination, especially in terms of employment in local public institutions (UARDPRB 2007, p. 7, 17; Jansen 2006, p. 189) . Consequently, after the mass return, many returnees left again, this time for economic reasons -to find jobs.
Furthermore, even under the best of conditions, some groups of forced migrants might not be interested in return. There may be gender and age differences, for example, with elderly men more likely to return and young women being less likely to return (Stefanovic and Loizides 2015) . As Jansen (2007, p. 55) Several studies indicate that the decision to return often emerges not from an individual's personal choice, but from negotiations among family members and neighbours (Black et al, 2004, p. v) . A survey of Columbian IDPs finds people active in local peasant organizations are more likely to desire to return to their pre-conflict homes (Deininger et al. 2004, p. 17) . Glatzer observes in his study of the late 1980s Afghani returns, 'Because in Kunar there are too few people it is unsafe, because it is unsafe, more people don't come. This circle cannot be broken by individual decisions to go back, but only by organized mass return' (Glazer 1990 , cited in Harpviken 2014 .
Similarly, the president of the local returnee organization in the Gorazde region of Bosnia remarks, 'Together the returnees endured most of the hardships and were safer when physical attacks on us still happened and the security situation was poor' (Porobic and Mameledzija 2014, p. 24) . In Zvornik region, mutual support helped Bosniac returnees deal with discrimination, unemployment, and poverty (Porobic and Mameledzija 2014, p. 12). However, none of these studies tries to explain why the desire for the community return varies among returnees and the still displaced.
Hypotheses
The existing studies contain many useful suggestions on how to measure the degree to which a displaced individual desires community return and the degree to which community return matters to an individual who has already returned, our present goals.
Accordingly, we draw on these studies. In addition, we examine the difference among the returnees across three main periods of return. Ultimately, we formulate and test five hypotheses.
The home hypothesis ties directly into why a person would want to return to the scene of his/her violent expulsion. While the definition and level of importance of 'home'
is debated (Jansen 2007, p. 44; Stefansson 2004, p. 9, 54; Bolognani 2007, p. 60, 65; Jansen 2006, p. 185; Hammond 2004, p. 37; Ghanem 2003, p. 3, 16) , returning to a place of comfort drives some returnees. Whether to reclaim lost property, regain old relationships or to feel returned to their spiritual 'roots' (Stefansson 2004, p. 2-3) , displaced Bosnians have shown a willingness to take on the hardship of return to their old community. Group return is expected to be preferred by those who wish to feel that sense of community. However, we expect there is a difference between urban and rural returns.
While the rural returnees to mono-ethnic villages might be able to recreate a pre-conflict local community (assuming enough people return), a sense of community in (once) multicultural cities cannot be recreated by (mono-ethnic) community returns. Moreover, while community return can bring safety in numbers in rural areas, in the urban areas it might make the minority community more visible and, thus, more vulnerable to ethnic harassment or worse.
One of the major problems of return is expressed by the security hypothesis. This hypothesis considers both perceived risk factors and risk tolerance of security issues in determining how likely possible returnees are to prefer group return. As it examines perceived risk, not actual risk, those surveyed may underestimate or overestimate their potential risk based on communications with other returnees, media stories, personal risk assessment, the ability to ward off threats and/or an overwhelming (or underwhelming) desire to return. We expect group return will be preferred by those who feel more vulnerable and seek safety in numbers. A study of Iraqi forced migrants indicates women are less likely to want to return to areas with high rates of sexual violence and violations of women's rights in general (Sassoon 2011, p. 158) . If this hypothesis is correct, people with a higher sense of physical vulnerability, such as women and the elderly, will be more likely to desire community return than young men.
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The nationalism hypothesis predicts hard core nationalists will strongly desire to return to their native area (Jansen 2007, p. 45; Dahlman and Toal 2005, p. 648,656) .
Nationalists are expected to prefer group return as way to reclaim the territory their ethnic group lost due to ethnic cleansing.
The fourth hypothesis argues social capital encourages the return process, including the dissemination of information and the provision of the resources needed to travel back or to facilitate group return (Lin 2000, p. 792; Brown 2002, p. 8-10; Walsh, Black and Koser 1999, p. 114-115) . Those who have more trust in their family members and neighbours may be more willing to work with them to return together. Conversely, those having poor relations with their families and neighbours may not see them as potential resources in a return process.
Finally, the socio-economic hypothesis expects those who have money will not need to rely on others to facilitate their return. If this hypothesis is correct, we should find a lower preference for group return among those with higher income and better education (measured as highest self-reported education level attained).
Data and Methods
The data were collected in a survey conducted in Bosnia in June and July 2013.
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The survey agency used a four-stage stratified sample: in the first stage, it selected municipalities using simple random sampling; 9 in the second stage, it selected a polling station proportional to its size within selected municipalities; in the third stage, it selected households using random route technique selection from a given address; finally in the fourth stage, it selected individuals within the household to be interviewed using a Kish Table. If respondents consented to be interviewed, the field interviewers conducted faceto-face interviews in the homes of the participants. The senior staff of the survey agency conducted the day-to-day monitoring of the data collection process and provided daily updates to the Principal Investigator. The response rate was 63.53%, with a total of 1,007 interviews completed. After data collection, the results were entered into an SPSS file, and original copies of the questionnaires were destroyed. An IPSOS survey statistician calculated weights based on inclusion probabilities and the demographic data available.
As Bochsler and Schlapfer (2011, p. 467) note, surveys on ethnicity in post-war Bosnia or other post-conflict societies can be used as a political tool to consolidate ethnic identity, rather than merely represent it. In our study, the focus on the three main ethnic groups of Bosniac, Croatian and Serbian seems valid given the low representation in our dataset for people who do not self-identity in one of the major groups. For the operationalization of the variables used, see Table 3 in the Appendix.
Out of the 1,007 respondents in the sample, 205 are minority still displaced; 300 are minority returnees; 246 are majority (returnees and still displaced); and 256 are never displaced. Our data analysis focuses on minority returnees (Figure 1 , Table 1, and Table   2 ) and minority still displaced (Table 3 ). In the multivariate analysis (Tables 2 and 3 ) the number of missing cases for the predictor variables leads to a reduction in the number of cases under analysis, from 293 to 212 and from 189 to 138, for minority returnees and minority still displaced, respectively.
Multivariate analysis of the predictors of the preference for community returns proceeds in two steps. We first look at the predictors of the preference among the returnees (Table 2 ) and then among the still displaced (Table 3) . In both cases, we produce three nested models: first model includes just the structural variables, the second model adds the experience variables, and the third model adds the attitudinal variables.
The predictor variables are the same for both returnees and still displaced, with the exception of fear of loneliness, which was only available for the still displaced. Building nested models in this manner, combined with additional data analysis, which allows us to identify and analyze some forms of causal complexity, such as the possibility that an attitudinal predictor might be influenced by structural predictors. Table 1 compares the characteristics of minority returnees across the three return periods. We see that across all three periods, minority returnees tend to be elderly people from rural areas. As expected, Bosniacs are the majority in all periods. Later returnees in the sample are likely to be women, to be less educated, to have experienced close loss during the war, and to report lower family incomes. However, gender differences between the periods are not statistically significant. Statistically significant differences over periods are in average family income (between the first and second periods only), educational levels (between the first and third periods only), and experience of close loss.
In addition, minority returnees in the second period are more likely to have strong memories of the pre-war life than minority returnees in the first period; the average importance of community returns is smaller for the returnees in the third period than in the second; and these differences are statistically significant. These findings suggest a possible decrease over time in the dangers the more vulnerable groups (the victimized and the poor) felt they would face in a return to Bosnia, implying some success in the improvement of security. In addition, the average significance of community return for an individual's decision to return seems to decline over time, again suggesting later returnees felt less vulnerable and thus had less need for the greater safety of community return. Table 2 shows the factors that influence the desire for the community return --that is, the importance of community return to an individual's decision to return --among the actual returnees. Model 1 indicates that age, gender, and education are not significant predictors. However, urban returnees are less likely to value community return than rural returnees, net of other factors, and this finding is statistically significant. Some ethnic differences are statistically significant as well, with ethnic Croats more likely to value community return than Bosniacs. Overall, the model fit is extremely poor. Model 1 offers some support for the home hypothesis but no other. Table 3 . This finding lends some support to the social capital hypothesis. Finally, the percent of variability explained is now 12%, indicating an improvement in the model fit.
Overall, Table 2 's findings give some support for the home hypothesis and social capital hypothesis. We find very little support for the nationalism hypothesis and no support at all for the security hypothesis or the socio-economic resources hypothesis. In opposition to the nationalism hypothesis, more nationalistic respondents seem less likely to desire community return. We also find the more nationalistic forced migrants are less likely to return than the more tolerant ones. In other words, nationalism matters, but its effects seem to be exactly the opposite of those assumed by the nationalism hypothesis. Table 4 in the Appendix. 4. Adjusted R 2 indicates the model fit, which is the percentage of the variability of the dependent variables correctly predicted by the model. It varies from 0% (no fit at all) to 100% (perfect fit). Source: Bosnia Survey June -July 2013
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We next look at predictors of the preference for community return among minority forced migrants who are still displaced (i.e. have not returned to the pre-war residence). We design three models: the first contains structural variables only; the second adds experience variables; the third adds attitudinal variables. As Table 3 shows, in Model 1, age, gender, education, and ethnicity are not statistically significant predictors of the preference for community return among the still internally displaced Bosnians, net of other indicators in the model. In line with the home hypothesis, the displaced from urban areas are less likely to want a community return than the displaced from the rural areas, and these differences are statistically significant. Adjusted R- 
Discussion
For those who are still displaced, it appears the home hypothesis may be a significant factor in wanting to return in a group. A possible explanation is the community appeal of 'home,' and such a community can be formed during a return together. This community formation can logically extend to the desire to avoid loneliness during the return process. For those returning to urban areas, the risk of returning together increases both visibility and vulnerability. A significant minority return to a city in one communal trip may spark fears of ethnic conflict and doom returnees to living in an ethnic ghetto, not their original homes. In contrast, rural areas may face the problem of 'ghost villages' where home is nearly impossible to recreate without fellow returnees, encouraging a group return as the more viable method to recreate both community and economy.
Membership in a displaced persons' association (DPA) turns out to be significant for the still displaced, with members more likely to desire a group return. They have greater access to shared resources, both in networking and in actual amount of support provided. Thus, the social capital hypothesis has some support.
It is interesting that while all ethnic Croats and Bosniacs who report DPA membership returned, some ethnic Serbs who are members of a DPA and who strongly desire community returns have failed to return. One has to wonder why a DPA membership seems to be such a powerful facilitator of return for Bosniacs and Croats, but not for Serbs. One possible factor, already noted in the Context section, is that Bosniac nationalist authorities were likely to offer support and resources for an organized return, while Serb nationalist authorities were more likely to actively discourage 'their' people from returning. That is, Bosniac nationalists have used return as a way to re-capture territories lost during the war (Toal and Dahlman 2011: 167-176) . In the same time, Turning to returned Bosnians, we find some support for the home hypothesis.
Again, we expect those from urban areas will not need a group return process to find a community within their old city. Having more interethnic friendships is correlated with a higher desire for group return. While this finding goes against the nationalism hypothesis, it might be read as support for the social capital hypothesis, but in a modified form.
Conceptualizing community based on local/ regional identity rather than ethnicity would facilitate shared resources and mutual help in mixed-ethnic group returns. In the case of mono-ethnic returns, interethnic friendships may assuage fears of returning to an area where another ethnic group is dominant, as returnees can expect some help from their friends on the 'other side.'
The security hypothesis is not supported among the returnees, with none of the related factors being statistically relevant. This suggests that either safety is not a significant issue for respondents or the group return process is not important in assuaging or heightening those fears. The socio-economic hypothesis is not supported. In fact, we find the reverse is true for returned respondents: those with a higher family income are more likely to prefer group return.
The nationalism hypothesis is not supported in this group either, as only one of the relevant variables --intra-ethnic trust --is found to be salient. Furthermore, those who are less nationalistic (open to intermarriage and to interethnic friendships) are more likely to desire group return. One possible explanation is that those who are very nationalistic will never return to a situation where they are in the minority in number and power, so the question of the form of the return does not make sense to begin with. Alternatively, those who are less nationalistic may be more open to re-establishing or creating either a new multicultural community, or, at the very least, a non-antagonistic mixed-ethnic community. Thus, nationalism matters and operates at both the contextual level (in terms of political pressure) and the individual level (in terms of who will decide to return).
The most surprising finding is that the post-war family trust variable has an opposite effect for the two different respondent groups. Among those who are still displaced, those who trust their family more are less likely to desire a group return.
Arguably, those who trust their family more will have resolved their family conflicts about return and will need less non-family help if and when they return. What is unexpected is that this factor is also significant for returnees, albeit for the opposite reason; those who report higher levels of family trust are more likely to have valued and benefited from a group return. One possible explanation is that the families who experience intense internal conflict over returning are more likely to still be displaced (as of 2013); in contrast, those who have already returned may have had a more amenable family dynamic. Several studies of returnees suggest discussions of return can produce major internal family conflicts, mostly along the lines of age and gender.
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Conclusion
While our approach is relatively useful for examining the experiences of Bosnians who are still internally displaced, it has lower explanatory power for those who have already returned. Nonetheless, we can safely state that the urban-rural divide and internal family dynamics play key roles in the Bosnian return process. Those from rural areas prefer group return, while those from urban centres appear to be uninterested in or even opposed to it. We expect this is due to the security and well-being concerns of returning alone to an empty village versus the dynamics of visibly returning en masse to urban centres. While the coordinated community returns have produced high returns in several rural areas or small towns in Bosnia --such as Kozarac or Drvar --our findings suggest this model cannot easily be extended to the larger cities.
It also appears that the return process can divide families, with younger generations seeing no future in Bosnia, particularly the underdeveloped rural areas, and the older generations wanting to retire in their homeland. For women and youth, community return could potentially reproduce patriarchal rural communities, with little opportunity for them. While it is important to strive to enable those who want to return to exercise that right, some displaced people might have very good reasons not to desire community return or return of any kind. The right to return should not be turned into forced return for those who found a new home elsewhere.
While return in Bosnia has largely ceased, the implications of this study could be et al: 2005) to express the estimated percent of the pre-war minority population which returned to the given municipality in the post-war period. The median value of the CR for the Federation was 12.49% and the median value for the RS was 14.74%. In the Federation, we randomly selected 12 municipalities where the CR was less than the median and 11 municipalities where it was greater than the median. Similarly, in Republika Srpska, we randomly selected 7 municipalities where the CR was less than the median and 5 where it was greater than the median.) 8. We did collinearity diagnostics for the models shown in Tables 2 and 3. The highest variance inflation factor value is 3.57, well below the critical value of 10. Thus, we do not seem to have a multicollinearity problem. 9. Additional statistical analysis indicates that controlling for family income weakens the impact of ethnicity. Sample evidence suggests major differences in median income by ethnic group of the returnees: 400 KM for Bosniacs/Muslims, 400 KM for Croats, 150 KM for Serbs, and 275 KM for Others. 10. We also tested for effects of the following predictor variables on the desire for community return among the still displaced and returnees: pre-war generalized trust and perceived proportion of local community experiencing wartime forced displacement. The bivariate relationships with the outcome variable were extremely weak. In the multivariate analysis, the relationships did not come close to statistical significance. Thus, we decided not to include these two predictor variables in the final analysis shown in Tables 2 and 3 . 11. For a number of women, time spent in the West or in urban Bosnian areas can be experienced as gender liberation from conservative and patriarchal norms and expectations (Parutis 2014, p. 167-171) . Research on Bosnian post-war returns to Sarajevo indicates that a major point of contention in the Bosniac community is a clash between the returnees and never displaced over the women's rights values embraced by some returnees during their time abroad (Stefansson 2004, p. 64) . A study of Moroccan returnees from the Netherlands indicates that young women are generally opposed to return (De Bree et al. 2010, p. 504) . A study of 2003-2005 returnees to Afghanistan indicates women and youth find it extremely difficult to adopt to the standard of living and social expectations in rural Afghanistan (Harpviken 2014, p. 64) . Finally, a study of Iranian immigrants to Sweden shows returning to stricter gender roles is a major deterrent to return for women and families with daughters (Graham and Khosravi 1997, p. 122) . Those who spent the exile in Bosnia (rather than abroad) more likely to value community return. Attitudes
APPENDIX
Memories of Pre-war Life
'To the extent that you do have memories or representations from life at your original home, would you say these memories are positive or negative? (Scale -5 to 5, where -5 is very negative and 5 is very positive, and 0 is neutral, DK=8, NR=9)
Those who have more positive memories are more likely to value community return.
Open to Intermarriage
Bogardus scale based, average score for the other ethnic groups.
More nationalistic more likely to value community return. Which of the following additional factors, if any, would most concern you about the prospect of returning to your pre-war home? (Scale 0 to 10, where 0 is insignificant and 10 is very important; 98-not relevant, 99-DK/NR ) I would feel isolated and lonely.
Those more concerned with loneliness more likely to value community return.
